SecPAL: Design and semantics of a decentralized authorization language by Becker, Moritz Y. et al.
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SecPAL: Design and semantics of a decentralized authorization
language
Citation for published version:
Becker, MY, Fournet, C & Gordon, AD 2010, 'SecPAL: Design and semantics of a decentralized
authorization language' Journal of Computer Security, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 619-665. DOI: 10.3233/JCS-2009-
0364
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.3233/JCS-2009-0364
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Journal of Computer Security
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
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of a Decentralized Authorization Language
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Abstract
We present a declarative authorization language. Policies and credentials are expressed using pred-
icates defined by logical clauses, in the style of constraint logic programming. Access requests are
mapped to logical authorization queries, consisting of predicates and constraints combined by con-
junctions, disjunctions, and negations. Access is granted if the query succeeds against the current
database of clauses. Predicates ascribe rights to particular principals, with flexible support for delega-
tion and revocation. At the discretion of the delegator, delegated rights can be further delegated, either
to a fixed depth, or arbitrarily deeply.
Our language strikes a careful balance between syntactic and semantic simplicity, policy expres-
siveness, and execution efficiency. The syntax is close to natural language, and the semantics consists
of just three deduction rules. The language can express many common policy idioms using con-
straints, controlled delegation, recursive predicates, and negated queries. We describe an execution
strategy based on translation to Datalog with Constraints, and table-based resolution. We show that
this execution strategy is sound, complete, and always terminates, despite recursion and negation, as
long as simple syntactic conditions are met.
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1 Introduction
Many applications depend on complex and changing authorization criteria. Some domains, such as
electronic health records or eGovernment, require that authorization complies with evolving legislation.
Distributed systems, such as web services or shared grid computations, involve frequent ad hoc collabo-
rations between entities with no pre-established trust relation, each with their own authorization policies.
Hence, these policies must be phrased in terms of principal attributes, asserted by adequate delegation
chains, as well as traditional identities. To deploy and maintain such applications, it is essential that all
mundane authorization decisions be automated, according to some human readable policy that can be
refined and updated, without the need to change (and re-validate) application code.
To this end, several declarative authorization management systems have been proposed; they feature
high-level languages dedicated to authorization policies; they aim at improving scalability, maintenance,
and availability by separating policy-based access control decisions from their implementation mecha-
nisms. Despite their advantages, these systems are not much used. We conjecture that the poor usability
of policy languages remains a major obstacle to their adoption.
In this paper, we describe the design and semantics of SecPAL, a new authorization language that im-
proves on usability in several respects. The following is an overview of the main technical contributions
and features of SecPAL.
Expressiveness Our design is a careful composition of three features for expressing decentralized
authorization policies: delegation, constraints, and negation.
• Flexible delegation of authority is the essence of decentralized management.
We employ a delegation primitive (“can say”) that covers a wider spectrum of delegation variants
than existing authorization languages, including those specifically designed for flexible delegation
such as XrML [24], SPKI/SDSI [31] and Delegation Logic (DL) [46]. The semantics of “can say”
is close to the “controls” operator in the original logical treatment of authorization, the ABLP
logic [2].
• Support for domain-specific constraints is also important, but existing solutions only consider a
specific class of constraints (e.g. temporal constraints [16], periodicity [15], set constraints [64]) or
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are very restrictive to preserve decidability and tractability (e.g. unary constraints [48], constraint-
compact domains [13]), and disallow constraints required for expressing idioms commonly used
in practice.
We provide a set of mild, purely syntactic safety conditions that allow an open choice of constraints
without loss of efficiency. SecPAL can thus express a wide range of idioms, including policies with
parameterized roles and role hierarchies, separation of duties and threshold constraints, expiration
requirements, temporal and periodicity constraints, policies on structured resources such as file
systems, and revocation.
• Negation is useful for expressing idioms such as separation of duties, but its liberal adoption can
make policies hard to understand, and its combination with recursion can cause intractability and
semantic ambiguity [63].
We introduce a syntax for authorization queries, separate from policy assertions. We permit nega-
tion within queries (even universally quantified negation), but not within assertions. This separa-
tion avoids intractability and ambiguity, and simplifies the task of authoring policies with negation.
Clear, readable syntax The syntax of some policy languages, such as XACML [54] and XrML, is
defined only via an XML schema; policies expressed directly in XML are verbose and hard to read and
write. On the other hand, policy authors are usually unfamiliar with formal logic, and would find it hard
to learn the syntax of most logic-based policy languages (e.g. [46, 43, 26, 49, 37, 48, 13]). SecPAL has a
concrete syntax consisting of simple statements close to natural language. (It also has an XML schema
for exchanging statements between implementations.)
Succinct, unambiguous semantics Languages such as XACML, XrML, or SPKI/SDSI [31] are spec-
ified by a combination of lengthy descriptions and algorithms that are ambiguous and, in some cases,
inconsistent. Post-hoc attempts to formalise these languages are difficult and reveal their semantic am-
biguities and complexities (e.g. [39, 38, 1]).
For example, it was recently proved that the evaluation algorithms of XrML and the related MPEG
REL are not guaranteed to terminate.1 Moreover, the analysis in [47] shows that the algorithm for
1Personal communication, Vicky Weissman.
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SPKI/SDSI is incomplete; in fact, the language is likely to be undecidable due to the complex structure
of SPKI’s authorization tags.
Logic-based languages have a formal semantics and, thus, are unambiguous. In many cases, how-
ever, the semantics is specified only indirectly, by translation to another language with a formal seman-
tics, such as Datalog [43, 26, 49], Datalog with Constraints [48, 13] or Prolog [46]. Instead, for the
purpose of succinct specification, we define three deduction rules that directly specify the meaning of
SecPAL assertions, independently of any other logic.
Effective decision procedures We show that SecPAL query evaluation is decidable and tractable (with
polynomial data complexity) by translation into Datalog with Constraints. We describe a deterministic
tabling resolution algorithm tailored to efficient evaluation of SecPAL authorization queries with con-
straints and negation, and present correctness and complexity theorems for the evaluation of policies that
meet our syntactic safety conditions.
Extensibility SecPAL builds on the notion of tunable expressiveness introduced in Cassandra [12] and
defines several extension points at which functionality can be added in a modular and orthogonal way.
For example, the parameterized verbs, the environment functions, and the language of constraints can
all be extended by the user without affecting our results.
In combination, we believe that SecPAL achieves a good balance between syntactic and semantic
simplicity, policy expressiveness, and execution efficiency for decentralized authorization. Although
system implementation is not the subject of this paper, SecPAL has been implemented and deployed as
the core authorization mechanism of a large system-development project, initially targeted at grid ap-
plications [29]. The system provides a PKI-based, SOAP-encoded infrastructure for exchanging policy
assertions. It also includes a policy-editing tool and support for invoking authorization queries from C#.
It relies on an instance of our evaluation algorithm specialized for some fixed, domain-specific verbs and
constraints. The development of a formal semantics for SecPAL, in parallel with its experimental use for
access control within a distributed computing environment, has led to many improvements in its design.
Contents The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates SecPAL on a simple ex-
ample. Section 3 defines syntax, semantics and safety of SecPAL assertions. Section 4 defines SecPAL
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authorization queries, built as conjunctions, disjunctions and negations of facts and constraints, and their
usage in authorization query tables. Section 5 explains how assertions are filtered to remove expired or
revoked assertions. Section 6 shows how to express a variety of authorization policy idioms in SecPAL.
Sections 7 and 8 give our algorithm for evaluating authorization queries and establish its formal sound-
ness and completeness. SecPAL assertions are first translated into Datalog with Constraints (Section 7);
the resulting program is then evaluated for a series of Datalog queries obtained from the SecPAL query
(Section 8). Section 9 discusses the prototype implementation, summarizes related works and concludes.
Appendix A provides auxiliary definitions and all proofs.
Earlier versions of this paper are published as a technical report [8] and, abridged, in a conference
proceedings [9].
2 A simple example
To introduce the main features of SecPAL, we consider an example in the context of a simplified grid
system. Access control in grids typically involves interaction between several administrative domains
with individual policies and requires attribute-based authorization and delegation [66, 21, 65].
Assume that Alice wishes to perform some data mining on a computation cluster. To this end, the
cluster needs to fetch Alice’s dataset from her file server. A priori, the cluster may not know of Alice,
and the cluster and the file server may not share any trust relationship.
We identify principals by names Alice, Cluster, FileServer, . . . ; these names stand for public
signature-verification keys in the SecPAL implementation.
Alice sends to the cluster a request to run the command dbgrep file://project/data plus a
collection of tokens for the request, expressed as three SecPAL assertions:
STS says Alice is a researcher (1)
FileServer says Alice can read file://project (2)
Alice says Cluster can read file://project/data if
currentTime()≤ 07/09/2006
(3)
Every assertion is XML-encoded and signed by its issuer. Assertion (1) is an identity token issued
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by STS, some security token server trusted by the cluster. Assertion (2) is a capability for Alice to read
her files, issued by FileServer. Assertion (3) delegates to Cluster the right to access a specific file on
that server, for a limited period of time; it is specifically issued by Alice to support her request.
Before processing the request, the cluster authenticates Alice as the requester, validates her tokens,
and runs the query Cluster says Alice can execute dbgrep against the set of assertions formed by its
local policy plus these tokens. (In practice, an authorization query table on the cluster maps user requests
to corresponding queries.) Assume the local policy of the cluster includes the assertions:
Cluster says STS can say0 x is a researcher (4)
Cluster says x can execute dbgrep if
x is a researcher
(5)
Assertions (4) and (5) state that Cluster defers to STS to say who is a researcher, and that any researcher
may run dbgrep. (More realistic assertions may well include more complex conditions.) Here, we
deduce that Cluster says Alice is a researcher by (1) and (4), then deduce the target assertion by (5).
The cluster then executes the task, which involves requesting chunks of file://project/data
hosted on the file server. To support its requests, the cluster forwards Alice’s credentials. Before granting
access to the data, the file server runs the query Cluster can read file://project/data against its
local policy plus Alice’s tokens. Assume the local policy of the server includes the assertion
FileServer says x can say∞ y can read file if
x can read dir, file dir,
markedConfidential(file) 6= Yes
(6)
Assertion (6) is a constrained delegation rule; it states that any principal x may delegate the right to
read a file, provided x can read a directory dir that includes the file and the file is not marked as con-
fidential. The first condition is a conditional fact (that can be derived from other assertions), whereas
the last two conditions are constraints. Here, by (3) and (6) with x = Alice and y = Cluster, the first
condition follows from (2) and we obtain that FileServer says Cluster can read file://project/
data provided that FileServer successfully checks the two constraints currentTime() ≤ 07/09/2006
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and markedConfidential(file://project/data) 6= Yes.
In the delegation rules (4) and (6), the “can say” assertions have different subscripts: in (4), can say0
prevents STS from re-delegating the delegated fact; conversely, in (6), can say∞ indicates that y can re-
delegate read access to file by issuing adequate can say tokens.
Assume now that the cluster distributes the task to several computation nodes, such as Node23. In
order for Node23 to gain access to the data, Cluster may issue its own delegation token, so that the
query FileServer says Node23 can read file://project/data may be satisfied by applying (6)
twice, with x = Alice then x = Cluster. Alternatively, FileServer may simply issue the assertion
FileServer says Node23 can act as Cluster (7)
This means roughly that every fact concerning Cluster also applies to Node23. Every fact in Sec-
PAL takes the form e verbphrase, where e is the subject of the fact, and verbphrase is the remainder.
Assertion (7) means that for any verbphrase, FileServer says Node23 verbphrase follows from File-
Server says Cluster verbphrase.
3 Syntax and semantics
We give a core syntax for SecPAL. (The full SecPAL language provides additional syntax for grouping
assertions, for instance to delegate a series of rights in a single assertion; these additions can be reduced
to the core syntax. It also enforces a typing discipline for constants, functions, and variables, omitted
here as it does not affect the semantics of the language.)
Assertions An authorization policy is specified as a set AC of assertions (called assertion context) of
the form
A says fact if fact1, ..., factn,c
where the facts are sentences that state properties on principals, defined below. In the assertion, A is the
issuer; fact1, . . . , factn are the conditional facts; and c is the constraint. Assertions are similar to Horn
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clauses, with the difference that (1) they are qualified by some principal A who issues and vouches for
the asserted claim; (2) facts can be nested, using the verb phrase can say, by means of which delegation
rights are specified; and (3) variables in the assertion are constrained by c, a formula that can express
e.g. temporal, inequality, path and regular expression constraints. The following defines the grammar of
facts.
e ::= x (variables)
| A (constants)
pred ::= can read [-] (predicates)
| has access from [-] till [-]
| . . .
D ::= 0 (no re-delegation)
| ∞ (with re-delegation)
verbphrase ::= pred e1 ... en for n = Arity(pred)
| can sayD fact (delegation)
| can act as e (principal aliasing)
fact ::= e verbphrase
Constants represent data such as IP addresses, URLs, dates, and times. We use A, B, C as meta vari-
ables for constants, usually for denoting principals. Variables only range over the domain of constants —
not predicates, facts, claims or assertions. Predicates are user-defined, application-specific verb phrases
(intended to express capabilities of a subject) of fixed arity with holes for their object parameters; holes
may appear at any fixed position in verb phrases, as in e.g. has access from [−] till [−]. In the gram-
mar above, pred e1 ... en denotes the verb phrase obtained by inserting the arguments e1 up to en into
the predicate holes. We say that a fact is nested when it includes a can say, and is flat otherwise. For
example, the fact Bob can read f is flat, but Charlie can say0 Bob can read f is nested.
Constraints Constraints c range over any constraint domain that extends the basic constraint domain
shown below. Basic constraints include numerical inequalities (for e.g. expressing temporal constraints),
path constraints (for hierarchical file systems), and regular expressions (for ad hoc filtering):
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f ∈ {+,−,CurrentTime, ...} (built-in functions)
r ::= x
| A
| f (r1, ...,rn) for n = Arity( f )≥ 0
pattern ∈ RegularExpressions
c ::= True
| r1 = r2
| r1 ≤ r2 (numerical inequality)
| r1  r2 (path constraint)
| r matches pattern (regular expression)
| not(c) (negation)
| c1,c2 (conjunction)
Additional constraints can be added without affecting decidability or tractability. The only require-
ment is that the validity of ground constraints is decidable in polynomial time. (A phrase of syntax is
ground when it contains no variables.)
We use a sugared notation for constraints that can be derived from the basic ones, e.g. False, r1 6= r2,
and c1 or c2. We usually omit the True constraint, and also omit the if in assertions with no conditional
facts, writing A says fact for A says fact if True. We write keywords, function names and predicates in
sans serif, constants in typewriter font, and variables in italics. We use a vector notation to denote a
(possibly empty) list of items, e.g. writing f (~r) for f (r1, ...,rn).
For a given constraint c, we write |= c iff c is ground and valid. The following defines ground validity
within the basic constraint domain. The denotation of a constant A is simply [[A]] = A. The denotation
of a function f (~r) is defined if~r is ground, and is also a constant, but may depend on the system state
as well as [[~r]]. For example, [[CurrentTime()]] returns a different constant when called at different times.
However, we assume that a single authorization query evaluation is atomic with respect to system state.
That is, even though an expression may be evaluated multiple times, we require that its denotation not
vary during a single evaluation.
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|= True
|= r1 = r2 iff [[r1]] and [[r2]] are equal constants
|= r1 ≤ r2 iff [[r1]] and [[r2]] are numerical constants and [[r1]]≤ [[r2]]
|= r1  r2 iff [[r1]] and [[r2]] are path constants and
[[r1]] is a descendant of, or equal to, [[r2]]
|= r matches pattern iff [[r]] is a string constant that matches pattern
|= not(c) iff |= c does not hold
|= c1,c2 iff |= c1 and |= c2
Safety Conditions The expressiveness of an authorization language depends to a large extent on the
supported classes of constraints. However, adding a wide range of different constraint classes to a
language is nontrivial: even if the constraint classes are tractable on their own, mixing them can result in
an intractable or even undecidable language. Therefore, constraints have so far been either excluded or
heavily restricted, to an extent that not even our basic constraint domain would be allowed. For example,
RTC [48] allows only a subclass of unary constraints, and Cassandra [13] allows only constraint-compact
constraint domains. [64] only consider set constraints, and in [15], only temporal periodicity constraints
are considered. Furthermore, these systems require complex operations such as unground satisfiability
checking or existential quantifier elimination that are hard to implement.
We observe that a wide range of constraints are used in authorization policies, but that evaluation of
a constraint may be postponed until all of the constraint’s variables are instantiated. Accordingly, rather
than restricting constraints, SecPAL’s safety conditions (Definition 3.1) only ensure that constraints
will be ground at runtime, once all conditional facts have been satisfied. This approach facilitates high
expressiveness while preserving decidability and tractability, and also simplifies the evaluation algorithm
(Section 8), thus making it much easier to implement.
Definition 3.1 (Assertion safety). The assertion A says fact if fact1, ..., factn,c is safe iff the following
conditions hold:
• all conditional facts are flat;
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• all variables in c also occur somewhere else in the assertion;
• if fact is flat, all variables in fact also occur in a conditional fact.
Note the similarity to the safety condition in Datalog where all variables in the head must also occur
in a conditional literal [20]. SecPAL’s safety conditions are less restrictive, as variables in can say asser-
tions need not occur in any conditional fact, so the assertion FileServer says x can say∞ y can read f
is safe. Nevertheless, all answers generated from can say assertions are still guaranteed to be ground,
because the Datalog translation (Section 7) is designed in such a way that parameters of can say are in-
put parameters, i.e., can say goals are always called with all parameters fully instantiated; furthermore,
the safety conditions prevent can say from occurring as a (possibly unground) conditional fact or within
a query (see Section 4).
At first sight, the safety conditions seem to rule out blanket permissions such as FileServer says
x can read Foo (everybody can read Foo). However, this is not a problem in practice, because it is
possible to make the assertion safe by adding a conditional fact qualifying x, for example “if x is a user”.
The list of users could either be stored locally, or the server could delegate to a trusted third party, e.g.
by FileServer says TrustedDirectory can say0 x is a user. Alternatively, the server may accept
self-issued statements: FileServer says x can say0 x is a user.
The safety conditions guarantee that the evaluation of the Datalog translation, as described in Sec-
tion 8, is complete and terminates in all cases.
Semantics To be practically usable, a policy language should not only have a simple, readable syn-
tax, but also a simple, intuitive semantics. We now describe a formal semantics consisting of only
three deduction rules that directly reflect the intuition suggested by the syntax. This proof-theoretic ap-
proach enhances simplicity and clarity, far more than if we had instead taken the translation to Datalog
with Constraints in Section 7 as the language specification. Let a substitution θ be a function mapping
variables to constants and variables, and let ε be the empty substitution. Substitutions are extended to
constraints, predicates, facts, claims, assertions etc. in the natural way, and are usually written in postfix
notation. We write vars(X) for the set of free variables occurring in a phrase of syntax X .
Each deduction rule consists of a set of premises and a single consequence of the form AC ,D |= A
says fact where vars(fact) = /0 and the delegation flag D is 0 or ∞. Intuitively, the deduction relation
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holds if the consequence can be derived from the assertion context AC . Furthermore, if D = 0, no
instance of the rule (can say) can occur in the derivation.
(cond)
(A says fact if fact1, ..., factk,c) ∈ AC
AC ,D |= A says factiθ for all i ∈ {1..k}
|= cθ vars(factθ) = /0
AC ,D |= A says factθ
(can say)
AC ,∞ |= A says B can sayD fact
AC ,D |= B says fact
AC ,∞ |= A says fact
(can act as)
AC ,D |= A says B can act as C
AC ,D |= A says C verbphrase
AC ,D |= A says B verbphrase
Rule (cond) allows the deduction of matching assertions in AC with all free variables substituted by
constants. All conditional facts must be deducible with the same delegation flag D as in the conclusion.
Furthermore, the substitution must also make the constraint ground and valid.
Rule (can say) deduces an assertion made by A by combining a can say assertion made by A and
a matching assertion made by B. This rule applies only if the delegation flag in the conclusion is ∞.
The matching assertion made by B must be proved with the delegation flag D read from A’s can say
assertion. Therefore, if D is 0, then the matching assertion must be proved without any application of
the (can say) rule. If on the other hand D is ∞, then B can re-delegate. In Section 6, we show that
the boolean delegation flag D ∈ {0,∞} is sufficient for expressing a wide range of complex delegation
policies, including depth-restricted delegation.
Rule (can act as) asserts that all facts applicable to C also apply to B, when B can act as C is deriv-
able. A corollary is that can act as is a transitive relation.
Corollary 3.2. If AC ,D |= A says B can act as B′ and AC ,D |= A says B′ can act as B′′ then AC ,D |= A
says B can act as B′′.
The following propositions state basic properties of the deduction relation; they are established by
induction on the rules.
Proposition 3.3. If AC ,D |= A says fact then vars(fact) = /0.
Proposition 3.4. If AC ,0 |= A says fact then AC ,∞ |= A says fact.
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Proposition 3.5. If AC 1,D |= A says fact then AC 1∪AC 2,D |= A says fact.
Proposition 3.6. Let ACA be the set of all assertions in AC whose issuer is A. We have AC ,0 |= A says
fact iff ACA,0 |= A says fact.
Proposition 3.6 implies that if A says fact is deduced from a zero-depth delegation assertion A says
B can say0 fact then the delegation chain is guaranteed to depend only on assertions issued by B. XrML
and DL [46] also support depth restrictions, but these can be defeated as their constructs for depth-
restricted delegation do not guarantee this property. Section 6 discusses this issue in more detail.
4 Authorization queries
A reference monitor is a component, typically software, that given a request to access a sensitive re-
source, decides whether or not to grant access. A reference monitor based on SecPAL generates a
suitable authorization query, and evaluates the query against the current assertion context (containing
local as well as imported assertions). In SecPAL, authorization queries consist of atomic queries of the
form A says fact and constraints, combined by logical connectives including negation:
q ::= e says fact (atomic query)
| q1, q2 (conjunction)
| q1 or q2 (disjunction)
| not(q) (negation)
| c (constraint)
| ∃x(q) (existential quantification)
Negative conditions enable policies such as separation of duties, threshold and prohibition policies
(see Section 6). However, coupling negation with a recursive language leads to multiple possible models
[63], higher computational complexity, or even undecidability [56]. Our solution is based on the obser-
vation that negated conditions can be effectively separated from recursion by allowing negation only in
authorization queries. Collecting negations at the level of authorization queries also makes for clearer
policies whose consequences are easier to foresee. Indeed, SecPAL authorization queries could be fur-
ther extended by even more powerful composition operators such as aggregation (as in Cassandra [13])
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or threshold operators (as in RTT [49]), without changing the assertion semantics and without affecting
the complexity results.
Safety conditions The safety condition on queries guarantees that (1) there are only finitely many
answers to the query, given that the assertions in the assertion context are safe; and (2) subqueries of
the form not(q) or c are always ground when they are evaluated, under the assumption that conjunctive
queries are evaluated from left to right (see Section 8).
We first define a deduction relationwith judgments of the form I  q : O where q is a query and I,O
are sets of variables. Intuitively, the set I represents the variables that are ground before evaluating q, and
O represents the new variables that become ground after evaluating q. The sets I and O are thus always
disjoint, and the set I∪O contains the variables that are guaranteed to be instantiated after evaluating q.
The requirement that only flat facts may occur in a query ensures that, during evaluation, can say
goals never get called with unground parameters, which could result in unground constraints, because
can say assertions may have variables that do not occur in a conditional fact. This restriction can be
relaxed (at the price of an additional rule) by allowing nested facts within a query as long as the nested
variables are grounded by the context.
The rules for constraints and negation require that the variables are contained in I, ensuring ground-
ness at evaluation time. The rules for disjunction and conjunction deal with groundness propagation.
After evaluating a disjunction, only variables occurring in both disjuncts are guaranteed to be ground.
Conjunction, on the other hand, grounds all variables occurring in any of the two conjuncts. Conjunc-
tions are evaluated from left to right, so the variable assignments resulting from the left conjunct are
taken into account when evaluating the right conjunct. Finally, an existentially quantified query ∃x(q)
grounds all variables also grounded by q apart from the bound variable x. The requirement that x must
not already be ground in the context I can easily be satisfied by alpha-renaming the bound variable.
fact is flat
I  e says fact : vars(e says fact)− I
vars(c)⊆ I
I  c : /0
I  q1 : O1 I  q2 : O2
I  q1 or q2 : O1∩O2
I  q : O vars(q)⊆ I
I  not(q) : /0
I  q1 : O1 I∪O1  q2 : O2
I  q1, q2 : O1∪O2
I  q : O x /∈ I
I  ∃x(q) : O−{x}
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Definition 4.1 (Authorization query safety). An authorization query q is safe iff there exists a set of
variables O such that /0  q : O.
Example 4.2. The authorization queries on the left hand side are safe; those on the right are unsafe.
Safe Unsafe
A says C can read Foo A says B can say0 C can read Foo
x says y can read f , x = A x = A, x says y can read f
x says A can read f , B says y can read f , x 6= y x says A can read f , B says y can read f , x 6= w
x says y can read f , not(y says x can read f ) x says y can read f , not(y says z can read f )
not(∃x(A says x can read Foo)) ∃x(not(A says x can read Foo))
The first query on the right is unsafe because atomic queries are required to be flat. In the second query,
the constraint x = A is evaluated without x being instantiated; this is rectified on the left hand side by
changing the order of the conjuncts. The last three examples on the right feature a constraint and two
negations whose variables are only partially grounded by the preceding context. The last example on the
left is safe because the negated query has no free variables, as x is bound by the existential quantifier.
Query semantics We write θ−x to denote the substitution that has domain dom(θ)−{x} and is equiv-
alent to θ on this domain. The semantics of authorization queries is defined by the relation AC ,θ ` q, as
follows:
AC ,θ ` e says fact iff AC ,∞ |= eθ says factθ, and
dom(θ)⊆ vars(e says fact)
AC ,θ1θ2 ` q1, q2 iff AC ,θ1 ` q1 and AC ,θ2 ` q2θ1
AC ,θ ` q1 or q2 iff AC ,θ ` q1 or AC ,θ ` q2
AC ,ε ` not(q) iff AC ,ε 0 q and vars(q) = /0
AC ,ε ` c iff |= c
AC ,θ−x ` ∃x(q) iff AC ,θ ` q
One can easily verify that AC ,θ ` q implies dom(θ)⊆ vars(q). (Note that vars(∃x(q)) is defined as
vars(q)−{x}.)
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Given a query q and an authorization context AC , an authorization algorithm should return the
answer set of all substitutions θ such that AC ,θ ` q. If the query is ground, the answer set is either
empty (meaning “no”) or a singleton set containing the empty substitution ε (meaning “yes”). In the
general case, i.e. if the query contains variables, the substitutions in the answer set are all the variable
assignments that make the query true. For example, the answer set for the query Alice says x can
read Foo contains all assignments to x of principals who can read Foo according to Alice. This returns
more information than just “yes, the query can be satisfied for some x”. Section 8 gives an algorithm for
finding this set of substitutions.
Authorization query tables In most trust management systems it is the reference monitor’s respon-
sibility to construct an appropriate authorization query upon an access request. This approach works well
if only basic queries are allowed, for example if all queries are predicates of the form permits(user,action)
as in Cassandra or Lithium [37]. In SecPAL, however, authorization queries are more expressive and
thus also more complex. Generally, a policy author writing a local assertion context will also have a set
of intended queries in mind. Therefore, authorization queries are conceptually part of the local policy
and should be kept separate from the reference monitor’s code.
For this reason, SecPAL introduces the notion of authorization query table which collects all autho-
rization queries intended for use with the local assertion context. An authorization query table is a finite
set of mappings r 7→ q from parameterized access requests r to authorization queries q.
Upon a request, the reference monitor issues an instantiated request lookup (instead of issuing a
query directly) that gets mapped by the table to the corresponding authorization query, which is then
used to query the assertion context.
Example 4.3. The task of policy authoring could be simplified by automatically generating simple
default mappings:
read(x, f ) 7→ FileServer says x can read f
write(x, f ) 7→ FileServer says x can write f
execute(x, f ) 7→ FileServer says x can execute f
...
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Example 4.4. More complex policies may require the policy author to specify a compound query. For
example, the request login(x) could be mapped to the following authorization query:
∃t1, t2(FileServer says x can login t1 till t2,
t1 ≤ currentTime()≤ t2),
not ∃t3, t4(FileServer says x cannot login t3 till t4,
t3 ≤ currentTime()≤ t4)
When login(x) is called, the above authorization query (with x instantiated) is evaluated against the
assertion context, and the answer is returned to the reference monitor, which can then enforce the policy.
This example features a universally quantified negated statement, encoded by a negated existential quan-
tifier. It also illustrates how a time-dependent prohibition policy with a Deny-Override conflict resolution
rule can be written in SecPAL. More elaborate conflict resolution rules such as assertions with different
priorities can also be encoded on the level of authorization queries. Just as with negative conditions,
prohibition makes policies less comprehensible and should be used sparingly, if at all [32, 27].
The safety condition for queries can be extended to authorization query tables:
Definition 4.5 (Authorization query table safety). A mapping r 7→ q from a request r to an authoriza-
tion query q is safe iff there exists a set of variables O such that vars(r)  q : O, and vars(q)⊆ vars(r).
An authorization query table is safe iff it only consists of safe mappings.
This condition can be checked statically. If the authorization query table is safe, all queries executed
at runtime are guaranteed to be safe as well.
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5 Assertion expiration and revocation
This section describes how expiration and revocation can be expressed in SecPAL. Expiration dates can
be specified as ordinary verb phrase parameters:
UCambridge says Alice is a student till 31/12/2007 if
currentTime()≤ 31/12/2007
Sometimes it should be up to the acceptor to specify an expiration date or set their own recency require-
ments [58]. In this case, the assertion could just contain the date without enforcing it:
UCambridge says Alice is a student till 31/12/2007
An acceptor can then use the date to enforce their own recency requirements:
Admin says x is entitled to discount if
x is a student till date,
currentTime()≤ date,
date− currentTime()≤ 1 year
Assertions may have to be revoked before their scheduled expiration date. To deal with compromise
of an issuer’s key, we can use existing key revocation mechanisms. But sometimes the issuer needs to
revoke their own assertions. For instance, the assertion in the example above has to be revoked if Alice
drops out of her university. Historically, revocation is most commonly associated with X.509-based
PKIs, which only support revocation of certificates for signing keys. Revoking an issuer’s signing key
revokes all the assertions signed by that key. SecPAL includes a simple mechanism for finer-grained
revocation, at the level of an individual assertion; one may revoke one or more of an issuer’s assertions
without revoking all of the issuer’s assertions.
We assume that every assertion M is associated with an identifier (e.g., a serial number) IDM . (The
identifier is kept implicit in the concrete syntax for assertions.) Revocation, and delegation of authority
to revoke, can then be expressed in SecPAL by revocation assertions with the verb phrase revokes IDM .
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For example, the revocation assertion
A says A revokes ID if currentTime()> 31/7/2007
revokes all assertions that are issued by A and have identifier ID, but only after 31 July 2007.
Definition 5.1. (revocation assertion) An assertion is a revocation assertion if it is safe and of the form
A says A revokes ID if c, or
A says B1 can sayD1 ... Bn can sayDn A revokes ID if c.
Given an assertion context AC and a set of revocation assertions AC rev where AC ∩AC rev = /0,
we remove all assertions revoked by AC rev in AC before evaluating authorization queries. The filtered
assertion context is defined by
AC −{M |M ∈ AC , A is the issuer of M, and AC rev,∞ |= A says A revokes IDM}
The condition thatAC andAC rev must be disjoint means that revocation assertions cannot be revoked
(at least not within the language). Allowing revocation assertions to be revoked by each other causes the
same problems and semantic ambiguities as negated body predicates in logic programming. Although
these problems could be formally overcome, for example by only allowing stratifiable revocation sets or
by computing the well-founded model, these approaches are not simple enough for users to cope with in
practice.
Implementing a system with a working revocation mechanism is not straightforward. For example,
as with certificate revocation lists, revocation in SecPAL depends on the availability of revocation asser-
tions. Depending on the application, the distribution of revocation assertions can be managed by pull
or push schemes. This and other revocation-related issues, which are orthogonal to the specification
mechanisms, are beyond the scope of this paper.
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6 Policy idioms
In this section, we give examples of assertions and queries to show how SecPAL can express a wide
range of policy idioms, in comparison with other authorization languages.
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) The following assertion specifies that users can pass on their
access rights to other users at their own discretion.
FileServer says user can say∞ x can access resource if
user can access resource
(8)
For example, if it follows from the assertion context that Bob says Alice can read file://docs/ and
FileServer says Bob can read file://docs/, then FileServer says Alice can read file://docs/.
Languages with restricted or no recursion such as XACML [54] or Lithium [37] cannot express such a
policy.
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) We assume a finite set of users U and a finite set of files S, char-
acterised by the verb phrases is a user and is a file. Additionally, every such user and file is associated
with a label from an ordered set of security levels. The constraint domain uses the function level to re-
trieve these labels, and the relation≤ to represent the ordering. Assertions (9) and (10) below implement
the Simple Security Property and the *-Property from the Bell-LaPadula model [14], respectively.
FileServer says x can read f if
x is a user, f is a file, level(x)≥ level(f)
(9)
FileServer says x can write f if
x is a user, f is a file, level(x)≤ level(f)
(10)
Role hierarchies The can act as verb phrase can express role membership as well as role hierarchies
in which roles inherit all privileges of less senior roles. The following assertions model a part of the
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hierarchy of medical careers in the UK National Health Service (NHS).
NHS says FoundationTrainee can read file://docs/ (11)
NHS says SpecialistTrainee can act as FoundationTrainee (12)
NHS says SeniorMedPractitioner can act as SpecialistTrainee (13)
NHS says Alice can act as SeniorMedPractitioner (14)
The first assertion assigns a privilege to a role; the second and third establish seniority relations between
roles; and the last assertion assigns Alice the role of a Senior Medical Practitioner. From these assertions
it follows that NHS says Alice can read file://docs/. This example illustrates that SecPAL principals
can represent roles as well as individuals; the principal FoundationTrainee is a role, while the principal
Alice is an individual.
Parameterized attributes Parameterized roles can add significant expressiveness to a role-based sys-
tem and reduce the number of roles [35, 50]. In SecPAL, parameterized roles, attributes and privileges
can be encoded by introducing verb phrases with arguments that correspond to the parameters, as in
Assertion (15). The following example uses the verb phrases can access health record of [−] and is a
treating clinician of [−].
NHS says x can access health record of patient if
x is a treating clinician of patient
(15)
Separation of duties In this simple example of separation of duties, a payment transaction proceeds
in two phases, initiation and authorization, which are required to be executed by two distinct bank
managers. The following shows a fragment of the authorization query table. The query associated with
initPay(U,P) is issued when a principal U attempts to initialize a payment P. If this is successful,
the reference monitor adds Bank says U has initiated P to the local assertion context. The operation
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authPay is called when a principal attempts to authorize a payment.
initPay(x,payment) 7→
Bank says x is a manager,
not(∃y(Bank says y has initiated payment))
(16)
authPay(x,payment) 7→
Bank says x is a manager,
∃y(Bank says y has initiated payment, y 6= x)
(17)
Note that the requirement that a successful execution of an initPay request should add a new fact to the
assertion context is not specified here. However, SecPAL’s authorization query table can be extended
in such a way that requests are mapped not just to queries, but also to a sequence of fact insertions and
deletions that is executed when the query is successful. Such an extended query table is also useful for
RBAC policies with role activation and deactivation within sessions, and can be given a semantics based
on transaction logic as in [10].
Threshold policies and compound principals SPKI/SDSI has the concept of k-of-n threshold sub-
jects (at least k out of n given principals must sign a request) to provide a fault tolerance mechanism.
RT T has the language construct of “threshold structures” for similar purposes [49]. There is no need
for a dedicated threshold construct in SecPAL, because threshold constraints can be expressed directly.
In the following example, Alice trusts a principal if that principal is trusted by at least three distinct,
trusted principals. We assume a function “distinct” that takes as argument a list of constants and returns
Yes if the list contains no duplicates, and No otherwise. Since the assertion is safe, the list will be fully
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instantiated at the time the function is called.
Alice says x is trusted by Alice if
x is trusted by a, x is trusted by b, x is trusted by c,
distinct([a,b,c]) = Yes
(18)
Alice says x can say∞ y is trusted by x if
x is trusted by Alice
(19)
A similar encoding combined with the authorization query table can be used to express compound
principal policies in SecPAL, without the need of dedicated language constructs as in ABLP [2] or XrML
[24]. Recall that the authorization query table is written by the policy author to provide an interface to the
assertions. The table entry below specifies that the request to authorize a payment takes three parameters
x, y and z, and maps the request to an authorization query that checks if x, y, z are three distinct managers.
Upon a user request, the reference monitor forwards the request to the SecPAL engine, which evaluates
the corresponding authorization query and returns the results back to the reference monitor, which can
then act based on the results.
authPay(x,y,z) 7→
Bank says x is a manager,
Bank says y is a manager,
Bank says z is a manager,
distinct([x,y,z])
Hierarchical resources Suppose the assertion
FileServer says Alice can read file://docs/ (20)
is supposed to mean that Alice has read access to the path /docs/ as well as to all descendants of that
path. For example, Alice’s request to read /docs/foo/bar.txt should be granted. To encode this, one
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might try to write the following assertion instead:
FileServer says Alice can read path if path  file://docs/ (21)
Unfortunately, this assertion is not safe. Instead, we can stick with the original assertion and put the
constraint into the authorization query table:
canRead(x,path) 7→
∃path2(FileServer says x can read path2, path path2)
(22)
The same technique can be used in conditional facts. With the following assertion, users can not only
pass on their access rights, but also access rights to specific descendants; Alice could then for example
delegate read access for file://docs/foo/.
FileServer says x can say∞ y can read path if
x can read path2,
path path2
(23)
The support of hierarchical resources is a very common requirement in practice, but existing policy
languages cannot express the example shown above. For example, in RTC [48], the  relation cannot
take two variable arguments, because it only allows unary constraints in order to preserve tractability.
Again, it is SecPAL’s safety conditions that allow us to use such expressive constraint domains without
losing efficiency.
Attribute-based delegation Attribute-based (as opposed to identity-based) authorization enables col-
laboration between parties whose identities are initially unknown to each other. The authority to assert
that a subject holds an attribute (such as being a student) may then be delegated to other parties, who in
turn may be characterised by attributes rather than identity.
In the example below, a shop gives a discount to students every Friday. Both this temporal period-
icity requirement and the expiration date of the student attribute can be expressed by a constraint. The
authority over the student attribute is delegated to holders of the university attribute, and authority over
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the university attribute is delegated to a known principal, the Board of Education.
Shop says x is entitled to discount if
x is a student till date,
currentTime()≤ date, currentDay() = Friday
(24)
Shop says univ can say∞ x is a student till date if
univ is a university
(25)
Shop says BoardOfEducation can say∞
univ is a university
(26)
SPKI/SDSI [31], DL [46], Binder [26], RT [49] and Cassandra [13] can all express attribute-based
delegation and linked local name spaces. SecPAL makes the delegation step explicit and thus allows
for more fine-grained delegation control, as demonstrated in the following examples of various sorts
of delegation. There are other general techniques to constrain delegation; for example, Bandmann,
Firozabadi and Dam [4] propose the use of regular expressions to constrain the shape of delegation
trees.
Constrained delegation Delegators may wish to restrict the parameters of the delegated fact. Such
policies typically require domain-specific constraints that are not supported by previous languages for
the sake of tractability. In the example below, a Security Token Server (STS) is given the right to issue
tickets for accessing some resource for a specified validity period of no longer than eight hours.
FileServer says STS can say∞
x has access from t1 till t2 if
t2− t1≤ 8 hours
(27)
The delegation depth in Assertion (27) is unlimited, so STS can in turn delegate the same right to some
STS2, possibly with additional constraints. For example, with Assertion (28) issued by STS, File-
Server accepts tickets issued by STS2 with a validity period of at most eight hours, where the start date
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is not before 01/01/2007 (but STS2 may not re-delegate).
STS says STS2 can say0 x has access from t1 till t2 if
t1≥ 01/01/2007 (28)
Depth-bounded delegation The verb phrase can say0 fact allows no further delegation of fact, while
can say∞ fact allows arbitrary further delegation. This dichotomy may seem restrictive at first sight.
However, SecPAL can express any fixed integer delegation depth by nesting can say0. In the following
example, Alice delegates the authority over is a friend facts to Bob and allows Bob to re-delegate at most
one level further.
Alice says Bob can say0 x is a friend (29)
Alice says Bob can say0 x can say0 y is a friend (30)
Suppose Bob re-delegates to Charlie with the assertion Bob says Charlie can say∞ x is a friend. Now,
Alice says Eve is a friend follows from Charlie says Eve is a friend. Since Alice does not accept any
longer delegation chains, Alice (in contrast to Bob) does not allow Charlie to re-delegate with Charlie
says Doris can say0 x is a friend.
SPKI/SDSI has a boolean delegation depth flag that corresponds to the 0 or ∞ subscript in can say
but cannot express any other integer delegation depths. In XrML [24] and DL, the delegation depth can
be specified, and can be either an integer or ∞. However, in both languages, the depth restrictions can be
defeated by Charlie:
Charlie says x is a friend if x is a friend2 (31)
Charlie says Doris can say0 x is a friend2 (32)
In XrML and DL, Charlie can then re-delegate to Doris via is a friend2, thereby circumventing the depth
specification. The SecPAL semantics prevents this by threading the depth restriction through the entire
branch of the proof; this is a corollary of Proposition 3.6. It would be much harder to design a semantics
with this guaranteed property if the depth restriction could be any arbitrary integer; this is also why
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XrML and DL cannot be easily “fixed” to support integer delegation depth that is immune to this kind
of attack.
Width-bounded delegation Suppose Alice wants to delegate authority over is a friend facts to Bob.
She does not care about the length of the delegation chain, but she requires every delegator in the chain
to satisfy some property, e.g. to possess an email address from fabrikam.com. The following assertions
implement this policy by encoding constrained transitive delegation using the can say verb phrase with a
0 subscript. Principals with the is a delegator attribute are authorized by Alice to assert is a friend facts,
and to transitively re-delegate this attribute, but only amongst principals with a matching email address.
Alice says x can say0 y is a friend if
x is a delegator
(33)
Alice says Bob is a delegator (34)
Alice says x can say0 y is a delegator if
x is a delegator,
y possesses Email email,
email matches *@fabrikam.com
(35)
If these are the only assertions by Alice that mention the predicate is a friend or is a delegator, then
any derivation of Alice says x is a friend can only depend on Bob or principals with a matching email
address. As with depth-bounded delegation, this property cannot be enforced in SPKI/SDSI, DL or
XrML.
Local namespaces In a distributed system, name clashes can occur if two collaborating principals
use the same local name for some property (such as a role name), and these names are imported via
can say-credentials into a common assertion context. One way to address this problem without requiring
all names to be globally unique is to require all such properties to have an extra parameter specifying the
namespace it originated from.
Suppose, for example, that both Bob and Charlie define assertions containing facts of the form A is a
friend. Alice wants to write a policy where all of Bob’s friends are also her friends, but Charlie’s friends
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should only enjoy the privileges of “acquaintances”. To distinguish Bob’s friends from Charlie’s friends,
the verb phrase “is a friend” is required to have a namespace parameter, e.g.
Bob says Doris is a friend (Bob′s namespace).
(Note that this example is concerned with name clashes regarding verb phrases rather than principals;
indeed, we assume here that principals are uniquely identified by their public keys.) Then Alice could
implement her policy as follows:
Alice says Bob can say0 x is a friend (Bob
′s namespace) (36)
Alice says x is a friend (Alice′s namespace) if
x is a friend (Bob′s namespace)
(37)
Alice says Charlie can say0 x is a friend (Charlie
′s namespace) (38)
Alice says x is an acquaintance (Alice′s namespace) if
x is a friend (Charlie′s namespace)
(39)
7 Translation into Datalog with Constraints
We now give a translation from SecPAL assertion contexts into equivalent programs in Datalog with
Constraints. In Section 8, we then exploit Datalog’s computational complexity properties (polynomial
data complexity) and use the translated Datalog program for query evaluation.
Our terminology for Datalog with Constraints is as follows. (See [20] or [3] for a detailed introduc-
tion to Datalog and [57, 56] for Datalog with Constraints.) An atom, P, consists of a predicate name
plus an ordered list of parameters, each of which is either a variable or a constant. An atom is ground if
and only if it contains no variables. A clause, written P0← P1, . . . ,Pn,c, consists of a head atom, a list
of body atoms, and a constraint. We assume the sets of variables, constants, and constraints are the same
as for SecPAL. A Datalog program, P , is a finite set of clauses. The semantics of a program P is the
least fixed point of the standard immediate consequence operator TP .
Definition 7.1. (Consequence operator) The immediate consequence operator TP is a function be-
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tween sets of ground atoms and is defined as:
TP (I) = { P0θ | (P0← P1, ...,Pn,c) ∈ P ,
Piθ ∈ I for i ∈ {1..n},
cθ is ground and valid,
P0θ is ground }
The operator TP is monotonic and continuous, and its least fixed point TωP ( /0) contains all ground
atoms deducible from P .
We treat expressions of the form e1 saysk fact as Datalog atoms, where k is either a variable or 0 or
∞. This can be seen as a sugared notation for a atom where the predicate name is the string concatenation
of all infix operators (says, can say, can act as, and predicates) occurring in the expression, including
subscripts for can say. The arguments of the atom are the collected expressions between these infix
operators. For example, the expression A saysk x can say∞ y can say0 B can act as z is shorthand for
says can say infinity can say zero can act as(A,k,x,y,B,z).
Algorithm 7.2. The translation of an assertion context AC proceeds as follows:
1. If fact0 is flat, then an assertion A says fact0 if fact1, ..., factn,c is translated into the clause A
saysk fact0← A saysk fact1, ...,A saysk factn,c where k is a fresh variable.
2. Otherwise, fact0 is of the form e0 can sayK0 ... en−1 can sayKn−1 fact, for some n≥ 1, where fact
is flat. Let ˆfactn ≡ fact and ˆfacti ≡ ei can sayKi ˆfacti+1, for i ∈ {0..n−1}. Note that fact0 = ˆfact0.
Then the assertion
A says fact0 if fact1, ..., factm,c
is translated into a set of n+1 Datalog clauses as follows.
(a) We add the Datalog clause
A saysk ˆfact0← A saysk fact1, ...,A saysk factm,c
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where k is a fresh variable.
(b) For each i ∈ {1..n}, we add a Datalog clause
A says∞ ˆfacti← x saysKi−1 ˆfacti,
A says∞ x can sayKi−1
ˆfacti
where x is a fresh variable.
3. Finally, for each Datalog clause created above with head A saysk e verbphrase we add a clause
A saysk x verbphrase← A saysk x can act as e,
A saysk e verbphrase
where x is a fresh variable.
Example 7.3. For example, the assertion
A says B can say∞ y can say0 C can read z if y can read Foo
is translated into
A saysk B can say∞ y can say0 C can read z ← A saysk y can read Foo
A says∞ y can say0 C can read z ←
x says∞ y can say0 C can read z ,
A says∞ x can say∞ y can say0 C can read z
A says∞ C can read z ←
x says0 C can read z ,
A says∞ x can say0 C can read z
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RESOLVE-CLAUSE(〈P〉)
Ans(P) := /0;
foreach (Q← ~Q,c) ∈ P do
if nd = resolve(〈P;Q :: ~Q;c;Q; [ ];Cl〉,P)
exists then
PROCESS-NODE(nd)
PROCESS-ANSWER(nd)
match nd with 〈P; [ ];c; ; ; 〉 in
if nd /∈Ans(P) then
Ans(P) :=Ans(P)∪{nd};
foreach nd′ ∈Wait(P) do
if nd′′ = resolve(nd′,nd) exists then
PROCESS-NODE(nd′′)
PROCESS-NODE(nd)
match nd with 〈P;~Q;c; ; ; 〉 in
if ~Q = [ ] then
PROCESS-ANSWER(nd)
else match ~Q with Q0 :: in
if there exists Q′0 ∈ dom(Ans)
such that Q0 4 Q′0 then
Wait(Q′0) :=Wait(Q
′
0)∪{nd};
foreach nd′ ∈Ans(Q′0) do
if nd′′ = resolve(nd,nd′) exists then
PROCESS-NODE(nd′′)
else
Wait(Q0) := {nd};
RESOLVE-CLAUSE(〈Q0〉)
Figure 1: A tabled resolution algorithm for evaluating Datalog queries.
in Steps 2a and 2b. Finally, in Step 3, the following clauses are also added:
A saysk x can say∞ y can say0 C can read z ←
A saysk x can act as B,
A saysk B can say∞ y can say0 C can read z
A says∞ x can say0 C can read z ←
A saysk x can act as y,
A says∞ y can say0 C can read z
A says∞ x can read z ←
A saysk x can act as C,
A says∞ C can read z
Intuitively, the says subscript keeps track of the delegation depth, just like the D in the three semantic
rules in Section 3. This correspondence is reflected in the following theorem that relates the Datalog
translation to the SecPAL semantics.
Theorem 7.4 (Soundness and completeness). Let P be the Datalog translation of a safe assertion
context AC . We have A saysD fact ∈ TωP ( /0) iff AC ,D |= A says fact.
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8 Evaluation of authorization queries
This section describes an algorithm for evaluating authorization queries (Section 4) against a SecPAL
assertion context.
8.1 Atomic Datalog queries
The first step is to evaluate atomic Datalog queries of the form e says∞ fact (i.e., computing all query
instances that are in TωP ( /0)) against the Datalog program P obtained by translation. The naive bottom-up
approach [3], where the fixed-point model is precomputed for all queries, is not suitable, as the assertion
context may be completely different between different requests. Furthermore, top-down resolution al-
gorithms are usually more efficient in computing fully or partially instantiated goals. However, standard
SLD resolution (as used in e.g. Prolog) may run into loops even for simple assertion contexts. Tabling,
or memoing, is an efficient approach for guaranteeing termination by incorporating some bottom-up
techniques into a top-down resolution strategy [60, 28, 23]. Tabling has also been applied to Datalog
with Constraints, but requires complex constraint solving procedures [62].
Our tabling algorithm is a simplified and deterministic version that is tailored to the clauses produced
by the translation of a safe assertion context (as described in Section 7). It does not require constraint
solving and is thus simpler to implement. A node is either a root node of the form 〈P〉, where the index
P is an atom, or a sextuple 〈P;~Q;c;S; ~nd;Cl〉, where ~Q is a list of atoms (the subgoals), c a constraint, S
an atom (the partial answer), ~nd a list of sextuple nodes (the child nodes), and Cl a clause.
The algorithm makes use of two tables. The answer table Ans maps atoms to sets of answer nodes
(i.e., nodes where ~Q is empty and c = True). The set Ans(P) is used to store all the found answer
nodes pertaining to a query 〈P〉. The wait table Wait maps atoms to sets of nodes with nonempty lists
of subgoals. Wait(P) is a list of all those nodes whose current subgoal (i.e., the left-most subgoal) is
waiting for answers from 〈P〉. Whenever a new answer for 〈P〉 is produced, the computation of these
waiting nodes is resumed.
Before presenting the algorithm in detail, we define a number of terms. The function simplify is
a function on constraints whose return value is always an equivalent constraint, and if the argument is
ground, the return value is either True or False.
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The infix operators :: and @ denote the cons and append operations on lists, respectively.
Let P and Q range over atoms. A variable renaming for P is an injective substitution whose range
consists only of variables. A fresh renaming of P is a variable renaming for P such that the variables in
its range have not appeared anywhere else. A substitution θ is no less general than θ′ iff there exists a
substitution ρ such that θ′ = θρ.
A substitution θ is a unifier of P and Q iff Pθ=Qθ. A substitution θ is a most general unifier of P and
Q iff it is no less general than any other unifier of P and Q. When P and Q are unifiable, they also have a
most general unifier that is unique up to variable renaming. We denote it by mgu(P,Q). Finding the most
general unifier is relatively simple (see [44] for an overview) but there are more intricate algorithms that
run in linear time, see e.g. [55, 51].
Let P be an instance of Q iff P = Qθ for some substitution θ, in which case we write P4 Q.
A node nd ≡ 〈P;Q :: ~Q;c;S; ~nd;Cl〉 and an atom Q′ are resolvable iff some Q′′ is a fresh vari-
able renaming of Q′, θ ≡ mgu(Q,Q′′) exists and d ≡ simplify(cθ) 6= False. Their resolvent is nd′′ ≡
〈P;~Qθ;d;Sθ; ~nd;Cl〉, and θ is their resolution unifier. We write resolve(nd,Q′) = nd′′ if nd and Q′ are re-
solvable. By extension, a node nd ≡ 〈P;Q :: ~Q;c;S; ~nd;Cl〉 and an answer node nd′ ≡ 〈 ; [ ];True;Q′; ; 〉
are resolvable iff nd and Q′ are resolvable with resolution unifier θ, and their resolvent is nd′′ ≡
〈P;~Qθ;d;Sθ; ~nd@[nd′];Cl〉. We write resolve(nd,nd′) = nd′′ if nd and nd′ are resolvable.
Figure 1 shows the pseudocode of our Datalog evaluation algorithm. Let P be an atom and Ans be
an answer table. Then AnswersP (P,Ans) is defined as
{θ : 〈 ; ; ;S; ; 〉 ∈Ans(P′),S = Pθ,dom(θ)⊆ vars(P)}
if there exists an atom P′ ∈ dom(Ans) such that P 4 P′. In other words, if the supplied answer table
already contains a suitable answer set, we can just return the existing answers. If no such atom exists in
the domain of Ans and if the execution of RESOLVE-CLAUSE(〈P〉) terminates with initial answer table
Ans and an initially empty wait table, then AnswersP (P,Ans) is defined as
{θ : 〈 ; ; ;S; ; 〉 ∈Ans′(P),S = Pθ,dom(θ)⊆ vars(P)}
where Ans′ is the modified answer table after the call. In all other cases AnswersP (P,Ans) is undefined.
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Theorem 8.4 states the termination, soundness and completeness properties of AnswersP . These proper-
ties will be exploited in Section 8 where we present an algorithm for evaluating composite authorization
queries.
At first sight, completeness with respect to TωP ( /0) depends on P being Datalog-safe, i.e., all variables
in the head atom must occur in a body atom. However, the translation of a safe SecPAL assertion context
does not always result in a Datalog-safe program. We define an alternative notion of safety for Datalog
programs that is satisfied by the SecPAL translation and that still preserves completeness.
Definition 8.1. Every parameter position of a predicate is associated with either IN or OUT. A Datalog
clause is IN/ OUT-safe iff any OUT-variable in the head also occurs as an OUT-variable in the body,
and any IN-variable in a body atom also occurs as IN-variable in the head or as OUT-variable in a
preceding body atom. A Datalog program P is IN/ OUT-safe iff all its clauses are IN/OUT-safe. A
query P is IN/ OUT-safe iff all its IN-parameters are ground.
Lemma 8.2. If AC is a safe assertion context and P its Datalog translation then there exists an IN/OUT
assignment to predicate parameters in P such that P is IN/OUT-safe.
Definition 8.3. An answer table Ans is sound (with respect to some program P ) iff
for all P ∈ dom(Ans) : 〈P′; [ ];True;S; ; 〉 ∈Ans(P) implies P = P′,S4 P, and S ∈ TωP ( /0).
Ans is complete (with respect to P ) iff for all P ∈ dom(Ans): S ∈ TωP ( /0) and S 4 P implies that S is
the answer of an answer node in Ans(P). Note, in particular, that the empty answer table is sound and
complete.
Theorem 8.4. (soundness, completeness, termination) LetAns be a sound and complete answer table,
P an IN/OUT-safe program and P an IN/OUT-safe query. Then AnswersP (P,Ans) is defined, finite
and equal to {θ : Pθ ∈ TωP ( /0),dom(θ)⊆ vars(P)}.
Actually, the modified answer table after evaluation is still sound and complete and contains enough
information to reconstruct the complete proof graph for each answer: an answer node 〈 ; ; ;S; ~nd;Cl〉
is interpreted to have edges pointing to each of its child nodes ~nd and an edge pointing to the clause Cl.
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AuthAnsAC (e says fact) = AnswersP (e says∞ fact, /0)
AuthAnsAC (q1, q2) = {θ1θ2 | θ1 ∈ AuthAnsAC (q1) and θ2 ∈ AuthAnsAC (q2θ1)}
AuthAnsAC (q1 or q2) = AuthAnsAC (q1)∪AuthAnsAC (q2)
AuthAnsAC (not(q)) =
 {ε} if vars(q) =
/0 and AuthAnsAC (q) = /0
/0 if vars(q) = /0 and AuthAnsAC (q) 6= /0
undefined otherwise
AuthAnsAC (c) =
 {ε} if |= c/0 if vars(c) = /0 and 6|= cundefined otherwise
AuthAnsAC (∃x(q)) = {θ−x | θ ∈ AuthAnsAC (q)}
Figure 2: SecPAL evaluation algorithm
Section 8.3 shows how this Datalog proof graph can be converted back into a corresponding SecPAL
proof graph.
8.2 Complex authorization queries
Based on this algorithm for evaluating atomic queries, we can now show how to evaluate complex au-
thorization queries as defined in Section 4. Let AC be an assertion context and P its Datalog translation.
The function AuthAnsAC on authorization queries is defined in Figure 2. The following theorem shows
that AuthAnsAC is an algorithm for evaluating safe queries.
Theorem 8.5 (Finiteness, soundness, and completeness of query evaluation). For all safe assertion
contexts AC and safe authorization queries q,
1. AuthAnsAC (q) is defined and finite, and
2. AC ,θ ` q iff θ ∈ AuthAnsAC (q).
The evaluation of the base case e says fact calls the function AnswersP with an empty answer table.
But since the answer table after each call remains sound and complete with respect to its domain (it will
just have a larger domain), an efficient implementation could initialize an empty table only for the first
call in the evaluation of an authorization query, and then reuse the existing, and increasingly populated,
answer table for each subsequent call to AnswersP .
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Finally, the following theorem states that SecPAL has polynomial data complexity. Data complexity
[3, 25] is a measure of the computation time for evaluating a fixed query with fixed intensional database
(IDB) but variable extensional database (EDB). This measure is most often used for policy languages,
as the size of the EDB (the number of “plain facts”) typically exceeds the size of the IDB (the number
of “rules”) by several orders of magnitude.
Theorem 8.6. Let M be the number of flat atomic assertions (i.e., those without conditional facts) in a
safe assertion context AC and let N be the maximum length of constants occurring in these assertions.
The time complexity of computing AuthAnsAC is polynomial in M and N.
8.3 Proof graph generation
When testing and troubleshooting policies, it is useful to be able to see a justification of an authorization
decision. This could be some visual or textual representation of a corresponding proof graph constructed
according to the rule system in Section 3.
Given a Datalog program P , a proof graph for P is a directed acyclic graph with the following
properties. Leaf nodes are either Datalog clauses in P or ground constraints that are valid. Every
non-leaf node is a ground instance P′θ of the head of a clause P′← P1, . . . ,Pn,c, where θ substitutes a
constant for each variable occurring in the clause; the node has as child nodes the clause, the ground
instances P1θ, . . . ,Pnθ of the body atoms, and the ground instance cθ of the body constraint. A ground
atom P occurs in TωP ( /0) if and only if there is a proof graph for P with P as a root node. The algorithm
in Figure 1 constructs such a Datalog proof graph during query evaluation of the Datalog program P
obtained by translating an assertion context AC . Each answer to a query is a root node of the graph.
Every non-leaf node is a ground Datalog atom of the form A saysD fact. Leaf nodes are either Datalog
clauses in the program P , or ground constraints that are valid. (See left panels of Figures 3, 4 and 5.)
Similarly, we can define a notion of proof graph for SecPAL such that there is a derivation of
AC ,∞ |= A says fact according to the three deduction rules of Section 3 if and only if there is a SecPAL
proof graph with AC ,∞ |= A says fact as a root node.
If during execution of Algorithm 7.2, each generated Datalog clause is labelled with the algorithm
step at which it was generated (i.e., 1, 2a, 2b, or 3), the Datalog proof graph contains enough information
to be easily converted into the corresponding SecPAL proof graph. The conversion is illustrated in
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Figures 3, 4 and 5.
9 Discussion
Implementation A prototype of SecPAL [52] has been implemented as part of a project investigating
access control solutions for multi-domain grid computing environments [29].
Assertions are XML-encoded then digitally signed and encrypted for distribution over the network.
Apart from the basic syntactic elements presented in this paper, the SecPAL XML schema [30] also pre-
defines a set of standard verb phrases and attributes that provide sufficient expressiveness for the majority
of grid applications. All verb phrases are augmented by a common set of environmental parameters for
specifying validity time spans, principal locations, and revocation freshness requirements.
The implementation provides tools for conversion between assertions represented in a text-based
format (almost identical to the concrete syntax presented here), in the XML schema, and in a .NET
object model. The latter provides an interface to the query evaluation engine for developing SecPAL-
based reference monitor implementations. Partial auditing of access decisions is performed according to
an XML audit policy. An audit log tool allows security administrators to view the details of past access
decisions and visualize answers to queries as SecPAL proof graphs. The current prototype includes
code samples for several grid-related, distributed delegation scenarios in which the assertion contexts
are assembled from native SecPAL assertions as well as Kerberos, X.509 and Active Directory tokens
that are translated into SecPAL at run time.
The prototype has been evaluated by Humphrey et al. [40] in the context of authorization for the
GridFTP protocol. Current implementation work includes tools for explaining and analyzing access
denials, based on the techniques described in [11].
Related work The ABLP logic [2, 45] introduced the “says” modality and the use of logic rules for
expressing decentralized authorization policies. SecPAL’s delegation operators can say∞ and can act as
resemble the “controls” and “speaks for” operators, respectively, of ABLP, but we have not established
precise connections. As more is learnt about the semantics of access control logics like ABLP, such as
their relation to classical modal logics [34], we hope for a better understanding of the formal connections
between SecPAL, ABLP, and related logics.
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Figure 3: Left: Datalog proof node with parent from Translation Step 1 or 2a. Right: corresponding
SecPAL proof node using Rule (cond).
Figure 4: Left: Datalog proof node with parent from Translation Step 2b. Right: corresponding SecPAL
proof node using Rule (can say).
Figure 5: Left: Datalog proof node with parent from Translation Step 3. Right: corresponding SecPAL
proof node using Rule (can act as).
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PolicyMaker and Keynote [19, 18] introduced the notion of decentralized trust management. Quite
a few other authorization languages have been developed since. SPKI/SDSI [31] is an experimental
IETF standard using certificates to specify decentralized authorization. Authorization certificates grant
permissions to subjects specified either as public keys, or as names defined via linked local name spaces
[59], or as k-out-of-n threshold subjects. Grants can have validity restrictions and indicate whether they
may be delegated.
XrML [24] (and its offspring, MPEG REL) is an XML-based language targeted at specifying licenses
for Digital Rights Management. Grants may have validity restrictions and can be conditioned on other
existing or deducible grants. A grant can also indicate under which conditions it may be delegated
to others. XACML [54] is another XML-based language for describing access control policies. A
policy grants capabilities to subjects that satisfy the specified conditions. Deny policies explicitly state
prohibitions. XACML defines policy combination rules for resolving conflicts between permitting and
denying policies such as First-Applicable, Deny-Override or Permit-Override. XACML does not support
delegation and is thus not well suited for decentralized authorization.
The OASIS SAML [53] standards define XML formats and protocols for exchanging authenticated
user identities, attributes, and authorization decisions, such as whether a particular subject has access to
a particular object. SAML messages do not themselves express authorization rules or policies.
The original Globus security architecture [33] for grid computing defines a general security policy
for subjects and objects belonging to multiple trust domains, with cross-domain delegation of access
rights. More recent computational grids rely on specific languages, such as Akenti [61], Permis [22],
and XACML, to define fine-grained policies, and exchange SAML or X.509 certificates to convey iden-
tity, attribute, and role information. Version 1.1 of XACML has a formal semantics [39] via a purely
functional implementation in Haskell.
Policy languages such as Binder [26], SD3 [43], Delegation Logic (DL) [46] and the RT family of
languages [49] use Datalog as basis for both syntax and semantics. To support attribute-based delegation,
these languages allow predicates to be qualified by an issuing principal. Cassandra [13, 12] and RTC [48]
are based on Datalog with Constraints [41, 56] for higher expressiveness. The Cassandra framework
also defines a transition system for evolving policies and supports automated credential retrieval and
automated trust negotiation.
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DKAL [36] is an authorization logic that extends SecPAL with constructs for specifying and reason-
ing about localized knowledge and targeted communication of authorization statements. DKAL can thus
express policies that cannot be easily encoded in SecPAL and other previous languages. In SecPAL, if A
says fact, then there is nothing to prevent B from importing this statement using B says A can say∞
fact. Importing knowledge can be controlled more finely in DKAL, where the says operator is param-
eterized by the intended target of the communication: only if A says fact to B can it be deduced that
B knows A said fact.
Dynamic updates to the authorization environment occur in history-dependent authorization policies
such as dynamic separation of duties and RBAC-style role activation and deactivation. Becker and
Nanz [10] have shown how Datalog-based authorization languages can be extended to support such
policies and be given a semantics based on transaction logic. SecPAL could be easily extended according
to that scheme: authorization query tables would map requests not only to queries, but also to a sequence
of insertions (and retractions) of basic assertions into (and from) the assertion context.
Much research has been done on logic-based access control languages for single administrative do-
mains that do not require decentralized delegation of authority. Many of these are also based on Datalog
or Datalog with Constraints, e.g. [15, 17, 42, 5, 64]. Lithium [37] is a language for reasoning about dig-
ital rights and is based on a different fragment of first order logic. It is the only language allowing real
logical negation in the conclusion as well as in the premises of policy rules. This is useful for analyzing
merged policies, but Lithium restricts recursion and cannot easily express delegation.
Conclusions We have designed an authorization language that supports fine-grained delegation con-
trol for decentralized systems, highly expressive constraints and negative conditions that are needed in
practice but cannot be expressed in other languages. Combining all these features in a single language
without sacrificing decidability and tractability is nontrivial. If authorization queries are extended by an
aggregation operator (which can be easily done without modifying the assertion semantics and without
sacrificing polynomial data complexity), SecPAL can (safely) express the entire benchmark policy de-
scribed in [6] and [7], one of the largest and most complex examples of a formal authorization policy
to date. Despite its expressiveness, we argue that SecPAL is relatively simple and intuitive, due to the
resemblance of its syntax to natural language, its small semantic specification and its purely syntactic
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safety conditions. Future work includes tools for policy authoring, deployment, and formal analysis.
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A Auxiliary definitions and proofs
This appendix contains proofs of all theorems stated in the main part of the paper as well as supporting
lemmas and definitions.
A.1 Authorization queries
Lemma A.1. Let AC be safe. If AC ,θ ` q then dom(θ)⊆ vars(q), and θ grounds all x ∈ dom(θ).
Proof. By induction on the definition of `.
Lemma A.2. Let AC be safe. If AC ,θ ` e says fact then dom(θ) = vars(e says fact).
Proof. Follows immediately from the definitions of ` and |=.
Lemma A.3. If I  q : O then for all substitutions θ that map variables to constants, I−dom(θ)  qθ :
O−dom(θ).
Proof. By induction on q.
Corollary A.4. If I  q : O and I ⊆ dom(θ) then qθ is safe, for all substitutions θ that map variables to
constants.
Lemma A.5. If /0  q : O and AC ,θ ` q then O⊆ dom(θ).
Proof. By induction on q.
Suppose q≡ e says fact. Then O = vars(e says fact) = dom(θ), by Lemma A.2.
Suppose q ≡ q1, q2 and θ ≡ θ1θ2. By the induction hypothesis, O1 ⊆ dom(θ1). Therefore, by
Lemma A.3, /0  q2θ1 : O2− dom(θ1). Then by the induction hypothesis, O2− dom(θ1) ⊆ dom(θ2).
Therefore, O1∪O2 ⊆ dom(θ1θ2).
The other cases are straightforward.
Lemma A.6. If AC and q1, q2 are safe and AC ,θ1 ` q1 then q2θ1 is safe.
Proof. From the definition of safety and  it follows that /0  q1, q2 : O1 ∪O2 where /0  q1 : O1. By
Lemma A.5, O1 ⊆ dom(θ1). Then by Corollary A.4, q2θ1 is safe.
42
A.2 Translation into Datalog with Constraints
Lemma A.7. (Soundness) Let AC be safe and let P be its Datalog translation. If A saysD fact ∈ TωP ( /0)
then AC ,D |= A says fact.
Proof. We assume A saysD fact ∈ TωP ( /0) and prove the statement by induction on stages of T nP .
Case Step 1 and 2a If A saysD fact is added based on a clause produced by Step 1 or 2a, then by the
inductive hypothesis, AC ,D |= A says factiθ for i = 1...n. Furthermore, cθ is ground and valid, so by
Rule (cond), AC ,D |= A says fact.
Case Step 2b If A says∞ fact is added based on a clause produced by Step 2b, then by the inductive
hypothesis, AC ,K |= B says fact and AC ,∞ |= A says B can sayK fact, for some B and K. By Rule (can
say), AC ,∞ |= A says fact.
Case Step 3 If A saysD B verbphrase is added based on a clause produced by Step 3, then by the
inductive hypothesis, AC ,D |= A says B can act as C and AC ,D |= A says C verbphrase, for some C.
By Rule (can act as), AC ,D |= B says C verbphrase.
Lemma A.8. Let AC be safe. If AC ,D |= A says B verbphrase then there exists an assertion in AC of
the form
A says e1 can sayD1 ...en can sayDn e verbphrase
′ if ...
for some e and ei, for i = 1...n where n≥ 0, and verbphrase is an instance of verbphrase′.
Proof. By induction on the SecPAL rules. If the last rule used in the deduction of AC ,D |= A says
B verbphrase was (cond), there exists an assertion in AC of the form
A says e verbphrase′ if ...
where B verbphrase = (e verbphrase′)θ.
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If the last rule used was (can say), we have AC ,∞ |= A says B can sayD B verbphrase. Therefore,
by the induction hypothesis, there exists an assertion in AC of the required form.
If the last rule used was (can act as), we have AC ,D |= A says C verbphrase. Therefore, by the
induction hypothesis, there exists an assertion in AC of the required form.
Lemma A.9. (Completeness) Let P be the Datalog translation of a safe assertion context AC . If
AC ,D |= A says fact then A saysD fact ∈ TωP ( /0).
Proof. Assume AC ,D |= A says fact. We prove the statement by induction on the SecPAL rules:
Case (cond) If the last rule used in the deduction was (cond), (A says fact if fact1, . . . , factk,c) ∈
AC is translated in Step 1 or 2a. Also, AC ,D |= A says factiθ, and by the induction hypothesis, A
saysD factiθ ∈∈ TωP ( /0). Furthermore, S |= cθ and vars(factθ) = /0, so by definition of TP , A saysD fact ∈
TωP ( /0).
Case (can say) If Rule (can say) was used last, we assume
1. D = ∞,
2. AC ,K |= B says fact, and
3. AC ,∞ |= A says B can sayK fact.
By Lemma A.8, there is an assertion in AC of the form
A says e1 can sayD1 ...en can sayDn e can sayK fact
′,
for some e, ei, Di with i= 1...n, n≥ 0 and where fact is an instance of fact′. In Step 2b, this is translated
into
A says∞ fact←
x saysK fact
′,
A says∞ x can sayK fact
′
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where x is a fresh variable not occurring anywhere else in the clause, so it can in particular bind to B. By
the induction hypothesis, B saysK fact ∈ TωP ( /0) and A says∞ B can sayK fact ∈ TωP ( /0). By definition of
TP , A says∞ fact ∈ TωP ( /0).
Case (can act as) If Rule (can act as) was used last, we assume AC ,D |= A says C verbphrase,
and AC ,D |= A says B can act as C, where fact = B verbphrase. By the induction hypothesis, A
saysD C verbphrase ∈ TωP ( /0). This is only possible if there is a clause in P of the form
A saysk e verbphrase
′← ...
where C verbphrase = (e verbphrase′)θ for some θ. By Step 3, there must also be a clause in P of the
form
A saysk y verbphrase
′←
A saysk y can act as e
A saysk e verbphrase
′
where y is a fresh variable not occurring anywhere else in the clause, so it can in particular bind to B. By
the induction hypothesis, we also have A saysD B can act as C ∈ TωP ( /0). Therefore, by definition of TP ,
A saysD B verbphrase ∈ TωP ( /0).
Restatement of Theorem 7.4. Let P be the Datalog translation of a safe assertion context AC . We have
A saysD fact ∈ TωP ( /0) iff AC ,D |= A says fact.
Proof. Follows from Lemmas A.7 and A.9.
A.3 Evaluation of authorization queries
The tabling evaluation algorithm in Section 8 can also be described as a non-deterministic labelled
transition system. We present this system here because it is easier to prove properties for it than for the
pseudocode in Figure 1. The results for the transition system apply also to the pseudocode, as the latter
is a straightforward implementation of the former.
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({〈P〉}unionmultiNodes,Ans,Wait) ResolveClause−−−−−−−−→ (Nodes∪Nodes′,Ans[P 7→ /0],Wait)
if Nodes′ = {nd : Cl ≡ Q← ~Q,c ∈ P ,
nd = resolve(〈P;Q :: ~Q;c;Q; [ ];Cl〉,P) exists }
({nd}unionmultiNodes,Ans,Wait) PropagateAnswer−−−−−−−−−→ (Nodes∪Nodes′,Ans[P 7→Ans(P)∪{nd}],Wait)
if nd ≡ 〈P; [ ];True; ; ; 〉
nd /∈Ans(P)
Nodes′ = {nd′′ : nd′ ∈Wait(P), nd′′ = resolve(nd′,nd) exists}
({nd}unionmultiNodes,Ans,Wait) RecycleAnswers−−−−−−−−→ (Nodes∪Nodes′,Ans,Wait[Q′ 7→Wait(Q′)∪{nd}])
if nd ≡ 〈 ;Q :: ; ; ; ; 〉
∃ Q′ ∈ dom(Ans) : Q4 Q′
Nodes′ = {nd′′ : nd′ ∈Ans(Q′), nd′′ = resolve(nd,nd′) exists}
({nd}unionmultiNodes,Ans,Wait) SpawnRoot−−−−−−→ (Nodes∪{〈Q〉},Ans[Q 7→ /0],Wait[Q 7→ {nd}])
if nd ≡ 〈 ;Q :: ; ; ; ; 〉
∀ Q′ ∈ dom(Ans) : Q 64 Q′
Restatement of Theorem 8.2. If AC is a safe assertion context and P its Datalog translation then there
exists an IN/OUT assignment to predicate parameters in P such that P is IN/OUT-safe.
Proof. Literals introduced by Algorithm 7.2 are of the form e1 sayse2 fact. We assign OUT to the
parameter position of e1, and IN to the position of e2. The parameter positions in fact are all OUT if it
is flat, and IN otherwise. Then by inspection and by assertion safety, all OUT variables in the head of
a clause produced by the algorithm also occur in the body, and all IN variables in the body of a clause
also occur in its head.
Definition A.10. A state is a triple (Nodes,Ans,Wait) where Nodes is a set of nodes, Ans is an answer
table, and Wait is a wait table. A path is a series of 0 or more labelled transitions between states, as
defined in the labelled transition system below. A state S ′ is reachable from a state S iff there is a path
from S to S ′. In the following, let AunionmultiB denote the union of A and B with the side condition that the
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sets be disjoint. If Ans is a function mapping atoms to sets of nodes, then Ans[P 7→ A] is a function that
maps atoms Q to Ans(Q) if Q ∈ dom(Ans) and Q 6= P and additionally maps P to A.
A state (Nodes,Ans,Wait) is an initial state iff Nodes = {〈P〉} for some IN/OUT-safe query P
(with respect to the IN/OUT-safe program P ), Ans is sound and complete, and Wait is empty. A state
S is a final state iff there is no state S ′ and no label ` such that S `−→ S ′.
Lemma A.11. (answer groundness) If (Nodes,Ans,Wait) is reachable from some initial state and
〈P; [ ];c;S; ~nd;Cl〉 ∈ Nodes then S and c are ground and c is valid.
Proof. We prove the following, stronger, invariant by induction on the transition rules. If 〈P〉 ∈ Nodes
then all IN-parameters in P are ground. If 〈P;~Q;c;S; ~nd;Cl〉 ∈ Nodes then all IN-parameters in S are
ground, and all OUT-parameters in S are either ground or occur as OUT-variable in ~Q. If the node has
a current subgoal Q (the head of ~Q), all IN-parameters of Q are ground.
The statement holds for any initial state because it only contains a root node with an IN/OUT-safe
query. Root nodes are only produced by SpawnRoot transitions. By induction, all IN-parameters of the
current subgoal Q are ground, hence the new root node 〈Q〉 satisfies the required property as well.
Suppose the node is produced by ResolveClause. The IN-parameters in its partial answer S are
ground because it is resolved with P which satisfies the same property, by the inductive hypothesis. If
an OUT-parameter in S is a variable, it must occur as an OUT-parameter in ~Q, as all clauses in P are
IN/OUT-safe. If the node has a current subgoal, its IN-parameters are either already ground in the
original clause, or they also occur as IN-parameters in the head of the clause, Q. But Q is resolved
against P which grounds its IN-parameters by the inductive hypothesis, therefore all IN-parameters in
Q are also grounded by the resolution unifier, which is also applied to the current subgoal.
In all other cases, the node is the resolvent of an existing node 〈P;Q0 :: ~Q; ;S′; ;Cl〉 with an existing
answer node 〈P′; [ ]; ;S′′; ; 〉, both of which enjoy the stated property by the inductive hypothesis. All
IN-parameters of the partial answer S of the resolvent are ground because S is the product of applying
the resolution unifier to S′ which already has the same property. For the sake of contradiction, assume
an OUT-parameter of S is neither ground nor occurs as an OUT-parameter in ~Q. Then it must be an
OUT-variable in S′ which occurs as an OUT-variable in Q0. But the resolution unifier unifies Q0 with
(a renaming of) S′′, and S′′ is completely ground, by the inductive hypothesis. But then the resolution
unifier must also ground that variable, which contradicts the assumption. Finally, if ~Q is non-empty and
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has a head Q, all its IN-parameters must be ground: if the corresponding parameter in the clause Cl
is a variable, it must be an IN-variable, therefore it must occur as an IN-variable in the head or as an
OUT-variable in a preceding body atom. In the former case, the corresponding parameter in S (which
originates from the head of Cl) is ground, and thus the parameter in Q is also ground. In the latter case,
it the corresponding OUT-parameter in the preceding Q0 is either ground or grounded by the resolution
unifier, as established before. Either way, the parameter in Q will therefore also be ground.
Lemma A.12. (node invariant) We write
⋃
Ans as short hand for
⋃
P∈dom(Ans)Ans(P). If (Nodes,Ans,Wait)
is reachable from some initial state and 〈P;~Q;c;S; ~nd;Cl〉 ∈ Nodes with Cl ≡ R← ~R,d, then:
1. S4 P;
2. Cl ∈ P ;
3. ~nd ⊆⋃Ans;
4. there is some θ such that Rθ = S, and ~Rθ = ~Q′@~Q (where ~Q′ are the answers in ~nd), and dθ is
equivalent to c.
Proof. By induction on the transition rules. The statements follow directly from the definition of the
transition rules and from the definition of resolution.
Lemma A.13. (soundness) If (Nodes,Ans,Wait) is reachable from an initial state S0 then Ans is
sound.
Proof. By induction on transition rules. The statement holds by definition for S0.
Now assume the state is not an initial state, and let Ans′ be the answer table of the preceding state.
For PropagateAnswer, we only have to consider the new answer nd ≡ 〈P; [ ];True;S; ~nd;Cl〉. By Lemma
A.12, S4 P; furthermore, Cl ≡ R← ~R,d ∈ P , and there exists θ such that Rθ= S and dθ= True. Also,
~Rθ is equal to the set of answers in ~nd which in turn is a subset of
⋃
Ans′. So by the inductive hypothesis,
~Rθ⊆ TωP ( /0). Therefore, by definition of TP , S ∈ TP (TωP ( /0)) = TωP ( /0), as required.
For the other transition rules the statement trivially holds by the inductive hypothesis.
Lemma A.14. (table monotonicity) If S ≡ (Nodes,Ans,Wait) is reachable from an initial state, and
S ′≡ (Nodes′,Ans′,Wait′) is reachable from S , then dom(Ans)⊆ dom(Ans′), dom(Wait)⊆ dom(Wait′),
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and dom(Wait) ⊆ dom(Ans). For all P ∈ dom(Ans): Ans(P) ⊆ Ans′(P). For all P ∈ dom(Wait):
Wait(P)⊆Wait′(P).
Proof. By induction on the transition rules. The statements follow from the observation that PropagateAnswer
and RecycleAnswers only increase Ans(P) and Wait(P), respectively; SpawnRoot always increases the
domains of Ans and Wait; and ResolveClause leaves Wait unchanged and either increases the do-
main of Ans (that can only happen if in the very first transition from the initial state) or leaves Ans
unchanged.
Lemma A.15. (completeness) If S f ≡ (Nodes,Ans,Wait) is a final state reachable from an initial state
S0 then Ans is complete.
Proof. We have to show that for any predicates P,S such that S ∈ TωP ( /0), P ∈ dom(Ans) and S4 P, S is
the answer of an answer node in Ans(P). For any such S, there is an integer n such that S ∈ T nP ( /0). We
prove the lemma by induction on n. The statement vacuously holds for n = 0.For n > 0, if P is already
in the domain of S0’s answer table the statement holds by definition of initial state and by monotonicity
of the transition rules with respect to the answer table (Lemma A.14). So now assume that P was added
to the domain as a result of a SpawnRoot transition.
By definition of TP , there exists a clause Cl ≡ R← R1, ...,Rn,c ∈ P and a substitution θ such that
Rθ = S, Riθ ∈ T n−1P ( /0), and cθ is valid. By the inductive hypothesis, for all R′i ∈ dom(Ans) such that
Riθ4 R′i there is an answer node nd′i in Ans(R′i) with answer Riθ.
Let P′ be a fresh renaming of P, θ0 = mgu(R,P′), and for i = 1..n, let
θi = θi−1mgu(Riθi−1,Riθ).
Furthermore, let
ndi ≡ 〈P; [Ri+1θi, ...,Rnθi];cθi;P′θi; [nd′1, ...,nd′i ];Cl〉
for i = 0..n. Note that ndn is an answer node with answer S, by Lemma A.11. We will now show that
ndn ∈Ans(P).
After P is added to the domain of the answer table in the SpawnRoot transition, there will eventually
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be a ResolveClause transition producing a new set of nodes that contains nd0, because 〈P; [R,R1, ...,Rn];c;R; [ ];Cl〉
and P are resolvable with resolution unifier θ0.
Suppose for some i = 0..n−1 that ndi gets produced as a node along a path leading from S0 to S f .
Then there must be a later RecycleAnswers or a SpawnRoot transition where ndi is added to the wait
table for some R′i+1 where Ri+1θi 4 R′i+1. Since θi is no less general than θ, we also have Ri+1θ4 R′i+1,
so Ri+1θ is the answer of some answer node in Ans(R′i+1), by the inductive hypothesis. Therefore, this
answer node is resolved with ndi either in a PropagateAnswer or a RecycleAnswers transition, and the
set of nodes produced by this transition contains ndi+1.
Therefore, along all paths leading from S0 to S f the nodes nd0,...,ndn are produced. Therefore, ndn
is eventually added to the answer table for P in a PropagateAnswer transition, and hence it is in Ans(P)
(by Lemma A.14), as required.
Lemma A.16. (termination and complexity) All transition paths starting from an initial state are of
finite length, and the path lengths are polynomial in the number of facts (i.e., clauses with empty body)
in P .
Proof. Let S be the set of predicate names that occur in the body of a clause in P , and let C be the number
of constants in P that occur as a parameter of a predicate in S. Further, let N be the number of clauses
in P , M the maximum number of distinct variables in the head of any clause in P , and V the maximum
number of distinct variables occurring in the body of any clause in P . When a root node 〈P〉 is produced
in a SpawnRoot transition, P is permanently added to the domain of the answer table. Due to the side
conditions of SpawnRoot, such a node is only produced if there is no P′ in the domain of the answer
table for which P4 P′. Moreover, the only predicate names and constants that can occur in a path are the
ones that also occur in P , of which there are only finitely many. Therefore, the number of SpawnRoot
transitions is bounded by CM , and thus the number of ResolveClause transitions is bounded by CMN
which is also an upper bound on the number of nodes produced by ResolveClause. PropagateAnswer
and RecycleAnswers both replace a node with a number of nodes whose subgoal lists are strictly shorter
until an answer node is produced. From any given node, these two transition rules together produce no
more than CV new nodes. Thus the number of nodes produced by them is bounded by CM+V N.
It follows that the length of any path is bounded by 4CM+V N. Hence all path lengths are polynomial
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in the number of facts in P as C is proportional to this number.
Theorem A.17. All paths from an initial state ({〈P〉}, , ) terminate at a final state. The answer table
of any such final state is sound and complete, and its domain contains P.
Proof. This follows immediately from Lemmas A.16, A.13 and A.15.
Restatement of Theorem 8.4. (soundness, completeness, termination) Let Ans be a sound and com-
plete answer table, P an IN/OUT-safe program and P an IN/OUT-safe query. Then AnswersP (P,Ans)
is defined, finite and equal to {θ : Pθ ∈ TωP ( /0),dom(θ)⊆ vars(P)}.
Proof. This follows directly from Theorem A.17, noting that the pseudocode in Figure 1 is a determin-
istic implementation of the labelled transition system.
Restatement of Theorem 8.5. For all safe assertion contexts AC and safe authorization queries q,
1. AuthAnsAC (q) is defined and finite, and
2. AC ,θ ` q iff θ ∈ AuthAnsAC (q).
Proof. By induction on the structure of q.
Case q≡ e says fact
1. By authorization query safety, fact is flat, hence all parameters in e says∞ fact can be assigned
OUT as in the proof of Lemma 8.2, hence q is an IN/OUT-safe Datalog query. Therefore,
AuthAnsAC (q) is defined and finite by Theorem 8.4.
2. Assume AC ,θ ` e says fact. This holds iff AC ,∞ |= eθ says factθ, by definition of `. The
translated program P is IN/OUT-safe, by Lemma 8.2, and we have already established above
that the query e says∞ fact is also IN/OUT-safe. So by Theorems 7.4 and 8.4, this holds iff (eθ
says∞ factθ) ∈ AnswersP (e says∞ fact). Since dom(θ) ⊆ vars(e says∞ fact) (by Lemma A.1)
and vars(eθ says∞ factθ) = /0, this holds iff the most general unifier of the two is θ, and iff
θ ∈ AuthAnsAC (e says fact).
Case q≡ q1, q2
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1. If q is safe, then q1 must also be safe, so by the induction hypothesis for finiteness, AuthAnsAC (q1)
is defined and finite. By the induction hypothesis for soundness, θ1 ∈ AuthAnsAC (q1) implies
AC ,θ1 ` q1. It follows from Lemma A.6 that q2θ1 is safe, so by the induction hypothesis for
finiteness, AuthAnsAC (q2θ1) is defined and finite, and hence AuthAnsAC (q) is defined and finite.
2. Assume AC ,θ ` q1, q2. This holds iff θ = θ1θ2 such that AC ,θ1 ` q1 and AC ,θ2 ` q2θ1. By
the induction hypothesis, this holds iff θ1 ∈ AuthAnsAC (q1) and θ2 ∈ AuthAnsAC (q2θ1) and hence
θ ∈ AuthAnsAC (q).
Case q≡ q1 or q2 The statements follow directly from the induction hypotheses.
Case q≡ not(q0)
1. By definition of authorization query safety, q0 must also be safe, hence AuthAnsAC (q) is defined
and finite.
2. Assume AC ,θ ` not(q0). By definition of `, q0 must be ground. Lemma A.1 implies that θ = ε,
therefore AC ,ε 0 q0. In other words, there exists no σ such that AC ,σ 0 q0. By the induction
hypothesis, this holds iff AuthAnsAC (q0) = /0 and hence AuthAnsAC (not(q0)) = {ε}.
Case q≡ c
1. By definition of authorization query safety, vars(c)⊆ /0, hence AuthAnsAC (q) is defined and finite.
2. This is similar to the previous case.
Case q≡ ∃x(q0)
1. If q is safe, then q0 is also safe, by definition of authorization query safety. By the inductive
hypothesis, AuthAnsAC (q0) is defined and finite, hence AuthAnsAC (q) is also defined and finite.
2. This is straightforward by the inductive hypothesis and the definition of `.
Restatement of Theorem 8.6. Let M be the number of flat atomic assertions (i.e., those without condi-
tional facts) in a safe assertion context AC and let N be the maximum length of constants occurring in
these assertions. The time complexity of computing AuthAnsAC is polynomial in M and N.
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Proof. The number of clauses with empty body in the translated Datalog program is proportional to
M. The constants stay unchanged, so the maximum length of any constant occurring in the set of those
clauses is N. From Lemma A.16 and the fact that each step in the labelled transition system can be
computed in time polynomial with respect to N (as the validity of a ground constraint can be checked
in polynomial time), we get that AnswersP is polynomial-time computable with respect to M and N.
The time complexity of AuthAnsAC for a fixed query is clearly polynomial in the computation time for
AnswersP , hence it is also polynomial in M and N.
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